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Summary  findings
India's  government procures  agrirultural products such  rationing, with rationing by ration cards or by queuing,
as rice, wheat, and sugar at below-market prices and  with and without the urban rich having access to the
sells them in both urban and rural ration shops. The  ration shops, witb and without free trade,  and with a
rest of such crops is sold in the open market. This  marketable surplus with positive, negative, or zero
creates a two-tier price system for consumers and  price elasticity.
producers.  He finds that in most cases the policy's impact on
Many (including Dantwala, Mellor, and Hayami,  the average price is either negative or ambiguous, and
Subbarao, and Otsuka) claim that such a policy raises  it is negative in the more realistic cases. A negative
the open-niarket  price so much that it ultimately  impact implies that farmers on the whole lose from the
incresses the average price received by farmers. If true,  procuremenit policy.
the gainers would be the farm sector as a whole and  But small farmers who are net buyers of the
low-income urban consumers with access to the ration  procured crops, and landless laborers, gain from a
shops. Losers would be the high-income urban  lower average price in the short run (especially if they
consumers who buy at the open-market price. This  have easy access to the rural ration shops). The long-
view has provided an intellectual basis for the policy.  run efiect depends on the impact of the lower average
Schiff examines a variety of cases: with and without  price on rural employment and wages.
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I. hItroducion
Governments  generally  discriminate  aF inst agriculture 'n developing  countries.l/  Export
crops are taxed in order to transfer resources to the rest of the economy  and food crops are often
taxed to provide cheapar food to the urban consumers.Z/ Several countries  have instituted  a
procurement  policy in order to attain the latter objective.
Through their forced procurement  policy, these countries  procure food commodities  from
producers at below-market  prices and sell them to low-income  consumers  through their ration shops.
The governments  thus impose  a producer levy on the output they procure. Producers may supply
additional  demand at any price the market will bear.  This policy results in a two-tier price system for
producers and consumers.  In the case of India, wheat (rice) procurement  in the Punjab has averaged
about 50 percent (from 60 to 80 percent) of output since the late 19b(
India's food procurement  policy applies  essentially  to wheat, rice and sugar.  Procurement is
carried out at the local market in the case of wheat and at the mill in the case of rice and sugar.  In
the case of wheat, the governnent has closed surplus  states following  droughts in order to depress the
procurement  price.  Imports were increased in tinie of droughts in the 1970s. This was less so in the
1980s when large stocks had U=en  accumulated.l/
1.  On the impact of sectoral, fiscai and industrial  policies on agricultural  incentives  in Africa, Asia, Latin
America  and Mediterranean  countries, see Schiff  and Valdes  (1992).
2.  However, Schiff and ValdWs  report that when food is imported,  most LDCs tax the imports  and protect the
producers. In those cases, the cheap food motive  is dominated  by the self-sufficiency  and revenue  motives.
3.  A brief review of India's procurement  and distribution  system  is provided in Subbarao  (1992). Also,
Gulati's 1987  study deals exclusively  with India's procurement  and distribution  policies.-3  -
Wheat farmers In India's surplus states have recently  refusi4 to sell their output to the
government  procurement  agencies. The boycott was intensified  after a call by the India Farmers
Union to boycott the procurement  agencies  in protest against low procurement  prices and severe
restrictions on the selling of wheat  to other states. ("The Times of India", May 8, 1992, and "The
Economic  Times", May 7, 1992.) On the other hand, Dantwala  (1967), Mellor (1968) and more
recently, Dantwala (1981) and Hayami, Subbarao  and Otsuka (1982) have argued  that farmers do not
suffer from the procurement  policy.  They claim  that, since procurement  leads to an increase in the
open market price, the average of the procurement  price and the open market price is no less than the
price farmers would have obtained in the absence  of procurement. In fact, Hayami, Subbarao and
Otsuka  formally model markets with governmeat  procurement  and conclude that procurement  policy
leads to an increase in the average price received  by farmers  both in the short and in the long
run.4/  That conclusion  is in  contradiction  with the behavior  of wheat farmers who rPsisted  selling
their output to the procurement  agencies.
Production  is assumed  to take place in a competitive  industry. Thus, farmers cannot ou their
own achieve  price discrimination  between  various consumer  groups in order to  aicrease  their profits.
The question  is whether  the public procurement  and distribution  policy can result in a price
discrimination  scheme which actually  raises farm profits.  Dantwala, Mellor, and Hayami, Subbarao
and Otsuka argue that farm profits unambiguously  increase. We argue that the latter occurs only
under somewhat  questionable  assumptions  (no rationing and no access  by the rich to the ration shops)
coupled with restrictive  conditions  (that the policy only be applied infinitesimally,  or alternatively  that
4.  We believe  there are several limitations  to Hayazni,  Subbarao  and Otsuka's analysis. For instance, they
desribe  the policy  as entailing  queues by the urban poor to obtain the rations at the fair price shops (p. 655) but
their model  includes  no cost of waiting  and assumes  no rationing  (p. 656).  Second, they state that the access to
the ration shlops  is general (p. 655) but their model  assumes  market  segmentation  with the access restricted  to
the  poor  (p. 656).-4-
parameters  of the dewand functions  be restricted  to specific values which are not supported  by the
evidence). We show that under reasonable  assumptions  producers will suffer from the policy.
T'his  issue was examiDed  in Schiff (1992)  for two cases involving  rationing, a positive price
elasticity  of marketable  surplus, a closed economy, and alternativeiy  with or without market
segmentation  between  rich and poor.  In this paper, we examine  the issue under more general
condidons. For instance, trade liberalization  In agricultural  products is presently being discussed  by
the government  of India (and has been carried out to a large extent in a number of other developing
countries). Hence, the free trade case Is examined  here.  The conditions  under which we analyze  the
impact  of the procurei.ent and distribution  policy are: with and without  market segmentation  between
urban rich and poor, with and without  rationing, with rationing  by ration cards or by queuing,  under
free trade and for a closed economy, for a positive, zero or negative  price elasticity  of marketable
surplus, and for the short run and long run.  These conditions  were not all considered  in previous
analyses. The results are summarized  in Table 1.5/
S.  We do not consider the case where the procurement  price in higher than the market  price and acts as a
price floor (which  has happened  in some bumper  crop years).  We also abstract from the impact  of the policy
on price variability. Note that Hayami,  Subbarao  and Otsuka find that procurement  policy increases the
likelihood  of market price instability.-5-
U. 
Preliminr  Issues
Before  proceeding to a full analysis  of the various cases, we examine  four issues.
1.  Let us first consider  the issue of urban market segmentation. Subbarao (1992), writing about
the excessive  cost and ineffectiveness  of India's Public  Distribution  System (PDS), claims that no
serious efforts were made to limit access  to the PDS to only the most vulnerable  g;oups.  In fact, aj
urban consumers are issued ration cards (which are even used for identification). Hence, the urban
rich have access to the ration shops.  If they do not consume  the product which is procured because
of Its poor quality (or because of the inconvenient  location  of the ration shop), we only have to
consider  the urban poor's demand  for the procured product.
If farmers can adiust the quality of their products so as to sell a lower quality a  the ration
shops, then the gain to the poor of having access  to the ration shops will fall, and so will the cost to
the farmers. At the limit, if farmers are able to costlessly  adjust qualify  to the lower ration-shop
price, then farm profits remain unchanged. And if low-income  consumers  are indifferent  between
better quality at the higher price (in the absence  of procurement  policy) and lower quality at the lower
price, then consumer  welfare remains unchanged. In that case, the policy is totally ineffective.
In reality, adjustment  of quality to price will entail  a cost and will result in a partial reduction in the
policy's effectiveness.
The same is true with evasion. If it can be done costlessly,  the policy will be ineffective. If
it entails a rising marginal cost, evasion  will occur up to a point and will reduce the effectiveness  of
the policy.  Authorities  have closed some surplus  states at times of drought to inter-state  trade in
order to limit evasion. We abstract from these two issues in the remainder  of the paper to keep the
problem manageable  and to enable a comparison  with the findings of others, but the above
qualifications  should be kept in mind.-6-
If the urban  rich do consume  products  which  are procured  and  have  equal  access  to the ration
shops,  the fluesdon  remains  as to whethcr  they  wil!  choos to buy at the fair price shops  if queues  are
present. 'The  value  of time  of the urban  rich is higher  than  that of the urban  poor, so that  their full
cost  of buying  at the fair price shops,  inclusive  of the value  of their time,  might  be larger  than  the
open  mar''  et price. However,  the uruan  rich typically  use the urban  poor (e.g., a servant)  to stand  in
line for them  and can thus  obtain  the procured  output  at the same  cost as the urban  poor.  nhis  iE
particularly  true In tho case  of India. In our analysis,  we consider  both  the case  of perfect  urbin
market  segmentation  between  rich and  poor and  of no market  segmentaticn.
2.  The marketable  surplus  M equals  output  S minus  rural  demand  DF, or:
(1)  M m S(P) -Dp (P,w),
where  P - price received  by farmers  and X = farmers'  profits. Then:
(2)  dM.dS_dDp  dS_Dp  3Dpj  31  dSIu  DF  ODFS  *
dP dP  dP  dP  !P +  3*J  dP[  OP  6Sr
since,  by Hotelling's  lemma,  83p  -S.
Assuming  the gooe  to be normal,  the effect 3  s of an increase  in P is positive,  and  it is
possible  that  dDF  > 0.  It is even  possible  that  01,  < o  f 3DP  S >  dS  _ ID,,.
dP  dP  Sir  dP  6P
Krishna  reports  for subsistence  crops  it. !ndia  values  for d(logM)Id(logS)  of 1.04 and 1.06,
implying  dM/dP >  0.  Most  studies  on developing  countries  also  obtain  positive  values  for dM/dP.
6.  For  1a  farmers  for whom  M S o, ddM  > 0.
dP
dDp  DDF  5 6Dp[  5Dp  _Dp  ,  SDp  dDp  SDp  EDp
*+  u-w  7  iSP ISU-  yr  D  +T  S  dP  liP IU  r
The first  term on the R.H.S.  is the  substitution  effect  and is negative.  Thus,  if
M9  S  ,  dDp < Oand d  > 0.
dP  ..-7-
We consider  here  the cases  of  dM c  0, dM - 0 and dM1  >  0,  but assume  that  the price  elanticity
dP  'dP  dP
of marketable  surplus  is larger  than  the  price elasticity  of urban  demand  to insure  that  the equilibrium
is both  unique  and  stable.
3.  If we assume  that  the procured  amount  is not sufficient  to satisfy  the demand  at the below-
market  price  and that  it is rationed  through  rati-a cards,  then  thosr  iho  have  access  to the procured
output  benefit  from  an intramarginal  income  gain,  and  the relevant  price (at  the margin)  for them (as
well  as for those  who  have  no access  to the rationed  output)  is the market  price. This  point  is
Important  for the formulation  of 'he demand  functions  in Cases  3 and  4 below.
We also examine  the case  of rationing  by ai!euing.  Supplies  at the ration  shops  may  no. be
sufficient  to satisfy  the tatipued  demand. This is relevant  in a number  of Indian  states. For instance,
Subbarao  (1992)  claims  that  in Andhra  Pradesh  where  coveLage  is wide,  the PDS met  only  34 percent
of the minimum  rice requirements  of the poorest. For all grains,  2.5 million  tons were  required  to
fill the ration  quotas  of the poorest  but  the State  Government  prrvided  only 1.7 million  tons, and
some  of it went  to other  groups. On the other  hand,  the states  of Gujarat,  Kerala  and  Tamil  Nadu
havc  been  quite  successful  in targeting  the poor. Thus,  our analysis  in the absence  of queuing  may  be
more  relevant  for nose  states. However,  the situation  is worse  in some  other  states  (Bihar,
Rajasthan, Madhya and Uttar Pradesh). The latter account for a large share of India's poor but
receive only a small share of PDS supplies. This has resulted in long queues. Hence, the analysis  in
the presence of queues is relevant for these other states.
4.  Authorities  set a procurement  price P0 which is below the market price Pm.  Procurement  is
generally carried o!lt  at the trader/processor  level and is proportional  to the marketable  surplus which
is sold by the farmer to the trader or processor. The price farmers receive is then a weighted  average
p  of the procurement  price P0 and the open-market  price Pm  . is also the marginal  incentive-8-
since procurement  is prcportional.2/ Then, output S, marketed  surplus M and rural demand Dp are
all a  Uaction  of  p  and not of PM. This assumes  that all farmers  have a positive marketed surplus.
The uIst-;butlon  of gains and losses by farm size has been examined  by Sah and Srinivasan.
The formal moded  abstracts from farm size and landless  laborers, but these issues are examined  in
each case below.  Small farmers mi^;ht  have a negative  marketed surplus, i.e., they might be net
buyers, and so would the landless  ft')orers.  The relevant price at the margin would then be the open
marlwt  price or the procurement  price, depending  on which market the small farmer or landless
laborer would have access t, . If purchases in the rural areas are made in the same proportion as in
the urban areas, then the relevant  price Is also P-BAR.
If the procurement  policy depresses  the average price P-BAR, then produccrs as a whole lose.
However, in the short run, small farmers who are tnet  buyers and landless  laborers gain.  And they
especially  gain It they have access to the ration shops in a proportion  which is larger than in the urban
areas,  i.e., if they pay less than the average price P-BAR. To be net buyers, small farmers mnust  earn
extra income and be employed  on other (arger) farms or must work in the non-farm rural sector.
Rural employment  opportunities  are generally  related to agricultural incentives. A lower averagi
producer price will depress rural employment  opportunities. Hence, the long-term impact  on small
farmers and landless  laborers of a procurement  policy which results in a lower average price depends
on the impact of the policy on rural employment  and wages.
The analysis  is carried out in a partial equilibrium  framework. For simplicity,  the model
abstracts  from administrative  costs and marketing  margins. This does not affect the results as long as
these costs are the same for the private and public sector. This assumption  bia. -s the results in favor
of those -btained by Hayami, Subbarao  and Otsuka since public sector costs are likely to be larger
than pryvate  sector costs.  The implication  of differential costs is discussed  in the concluding  section.
If the authorities  subsidize  the operatiou either in ter.ns of transport costs or by providing  low
consumer  prices (paying  fanners for procured  output more than they charge consumers  at ration
shops), then the average farm price will be larger than the average consumer  price.  In those cases,
farmers as a whole and consumers  will benefit more from the policy compared  to a case of no
7.  If a fixed amount were procured in each farm, the marginal  incentive  would Tle  the open market
price Pm*-9-
aubsidies. in this paper,  we assume that the procurement and distribution policy is self-fiuanced.  In
other words, no budgetary  re3ources  are used to provide explicit  consumer  subsidies. This enabies us
to compare our results wfth those of others (e.g., H3yami  et al.).
Farmers typically  produce more than one product. It is precisely because of the existing
substitution  possibilities  with other farm products that the sunply curve in equation (1) has a positive
slope.  We assume here that there are no dis irtions in the other product markets so that we can focus
exclusively  on the Impact  of procurement  an(' distribution  policies on  hie  product in question. That
also enables  us to compare our results with those of others.
We assume that there are three sets of demand, DR  of the urban rich,  p  of the urban
poor and rural demand Dp, and that the procured  output is only disLibuted in the urban areas.  We
also assume that output depends on current price and abstract from dynamic considerations  due to
production  lags or storage.
Case 1.  Free Trade
The procurement  policy has generally  been examined  in a closed-economy  setting.  The issue
of extending  the process of industrial  trade liberalization  to the agricultural  sector in India is part of
the current policy debate.  Such a process has already taken place in a number of developing
countries. In the case of free trade in the product  in question,  and under the small-country
assumption,  the analysis is simple.  The marku price P., is independent  of the procurement  policy.
Therefore, the average price  P  in the case of procurement  is lower than the market price in the
absence of procurement, since in the former case part of the crop is procured at a price  pO  < Pm
Thus, farmers as a whole lose.  In the short-run, though, small farmers who are net buyers
and landless laborers gain, while in the long run, the impact is ambiguous,  depending  on the effect on
rural employment  and wages. Those urban consumers  who have access  to the procured  output gain.- 10-
No consumers lose.  These results hold both in the short run (output  S given) and in the long run,
with or without rationing, and with or without market segmentation  between  urban rich and poor.
However, in the case of rationing by queuing,  arbitrage may lead to a length of queue such that the
cost (inclusive  of time) will be Pm in both markets.  (The reason for that is discussed  below in Case
3).  Then, no consumers  gain.
We can state
ProIosition 1.  Under free trade and the small-country  assumption,  procurement  has no
impact  on the open-market  price Pm' the average price  p  falls, farmers as a whole lose
(though small farmers and landless  laborers gain in the short run), no consumers lose and
those with access to the procured output gain. However, if procured output is rationed by
queuing,  consumers may not gain.
In the case of drought and managed trade, the open market price Pm rises and governments
have often closed  the surplus states (to prevent them from exporting  to the deficit states) in order to
keep the procurement  price PO  low and be able to purchase  the quantity  needed. Governments  have
also often Allowed  larger imports in response  to droughts when stocks were low or have sold stocks
when they were large.  Thus, when the procuren.etnt  policy has been applied most intensely  is
precisely when supply has been most responsive  (through imports  or reduction  in stocks)  and the
market has thus tended to be more open.  And, as we have seen above, under these circumstances,
the impact  of such a policy is more likely to be a fall in the average producer price  p.
The analysis above assumes  that the law of one price prevails. However, we know that there
is a gap between the FOB and CIF price at the port (say Bombay  in the case of wheat) and even more
so in the interior (say the Punjab). Pursell and Gulati (1993) have estimated  these margins for 1985-
87.  In the case of rice (wheat),  they were equal to 5 (17) percent at the port and 25 (43) percent in- I1  -
the main surplus area (Punjab). Thus, even under free trade, the products might behave as non-
tradables within a certain  price range. Then, the open-market  price might be able to increase with
procurement  and the effect on the average price would be ambiguous. This is less likely to happen at
ports where the price range is smaller (five percent for rice in Bombay)  than in more distant
locations.
We proceed with the analysis  under the assumption  of a closed economy  for the product
analyzed.  Our results also hold for the case where international  trade in that product is managed by
the government md  is independent  of the procurement  policy.
Case 2.  Closed Economy and No Rationing
In the case of no rationing, there must be market segmentation  between rich and poor.
Otherwise, all consumers  can buy at PO, resulting  in excess demand which will have to be
rationed.l/  Thus, the poor have unlimited  access to the procured output at price PO  and the rich
can only buy in the open market at price Pm.
Market equilibrium  is given  by:
(3)  M *  S(P) -DFIP, T(P)D =D(PO,Y  )  D  (Pm,YR),
where
P - qPo + (I-q) Pm  is the average price received  by farmers on their marketed  surplus M,
q  = proportion of marketed  surplus which is procured =  D P/M  in the case of no U
rationing, PO = procurement  price, Pm = open market price, S = output, DF = rural demand, DJ
8.  A possible exception  is the case where the price elasticity  of the marketable  surplus is so negative
that at the lower producer price PO  farmers release for urban consumption  exactly  the increase in
urban demand or more.  However, this raises problems  of multiple equilibria  and stability. As was
mentioned  earlier, we assume  here that the price elasticity  of marketable  surplus is larger than the
price elasticity of urban demand to insure that the equilibrium  is unique  and stable. Then, market
segmentation  must hold in the case of no rationing.- 12 -
= urban  demand  by group  j, j = P (poor),  R (rich),  YJ  = income  of urban  group  j, and  X = rural
profits.
We examine  the impact  of a change  in PO  on Pm  and  p  . The derivation  is presented  in
Appendix  A.  The solution  is given  by equations  A.3, A.5 and A.6. The sign  of  dP  is
dP 0
ambiguous  (see  equation  A.6). Since  dP to,  it follows  from (A.5)  that dq to,  and it then
dP~~dP  P
follows  from (A.3) that  ._.  to.  Thus,  it is not even possible in this case to know the effect on
dP 0
the open market  price  of a change  in the  procurement  price. These  results  hold  both in the very short
run (output  given)  and in the long run.
However,  if  dM/dP  =0,  then  dPM/dPO  < O  (Pm  rises  as  Po is reduced)  but the sign
of dP/dPo remains  ambiguous.  In that  case,  the urban  rich are worse  off since  they  buy  only at Pm,
while  the urban  poor (who  can  satisfy  their  entire  demand  at the low  PO ) are better  off. The effect
on the producers  is ambiguous.
If we start  from a situation  of no procurement  policy  (PO  = Pm ). we show  under  plausible
assumptions  that  if  dM 2 0, then dPm < 0 and dP  < 0,  i.e., in that case  a 'small' application
dP  ~~dP 0 dP 0
of the procurement  policy  leads  to an increase  in the open  market  price and  in the average  price
received by farmers. We set Pm  - Po = 0 in (A.6). Then
P  R
dDP  dDR
d-  (l-q) dU  _q dU
dPo  R  B/
(I_q)dM - dDU
and  from (A.3)
d%U  dM
dPm  0Po dP
dPo  B/- 13 -
Assuming  d.  20,  it follows that  B/  >  0 and  dP  <  o  We can rewrite  A/as:
dP  dPo
*./  D  RJ  EPUUDqER  UU-UEp  pU  E  M  U  E  E  where
P0 p  M  P0- M  PM  m  W  M  0m
=  price elasticity of demand of group J.  Since Pm =  P0, it follows  that if the price elasticity of
demand of the urban poor is larger than that of the urban rich, then  A/ <  0 and  d.P c<o.  In the
dP0
case of India, Radhakrishna,  Murthy and Shah have found that  -0.8  1  0.4,  so that
dP  <  0
dP0
Ihus, starting from a situation  of no procurement  policy (PO = Pm), a "sma'l" (infinitesimal)
application  of that policy (i.e., a 'small'  reduction in PO)  will result in an increase in Pm and  p  as
long as the price elasticity of marketed  surplus is non-negative  and the demand of the urban rich is
less elastic than the demand of the urban poor.  In this case, the policy leads to a price discrimination
which is beneficial  to the farmers as a whole. Net buyers in the rural area (small farmers and
landless laborers)  lose in the short run, while the long-run impact  depends on the effect of the average
producer price increase on rural employment  opportunities  and wages. Rich urban consumers  lose
and poor urban consumers  gain.  As is known from the theory of discriminating  monopoly,  a
necessary  condit an for producers as a whole to gain is that those consumers  who are charged  the
higher price (the rich) have a less elastic  demand.
We now state
Proposition  2.  In the case of a closed economy  and no rationing, the impact  on Pm and  p
is ambiguous  in general.  However, starting from Pm = Po (no policy), a "small" application- 14 -
of the policy will raise Pm and  p  if the elasticity  of the marketable  surplus is non-negative
and the demand  of the urban poor is more elastic than the demand  of the urban rich.  In the
latter case, farmers as a whole gain, the urban poor gain and the urban rich lose.  Net rural
buyers (small farmers and landless  labor) lose in the short run, while the long-term effect is
ambiguous.
The result dP/dP 0 < o  (which is essentially  the result claimed by Dantwala and by Hayami,
Otsuka and Subbarao)  only holds locally, i.e., around Pm = Po, but it is ambiguous  in the more
general and interesting  case where Pm is larger than P0 or where the change in P0 is 'large" (e.g., in
the case of food shortages), unless further restrictions  are imposed.
For instance, assume the demand of the urban rich is inelastic  and that of the urban poor is
elastic, and the marketed  surplus is constant. Then any reductica in P-ZERO will raise producer
revenue both because of the larger sales to the poor at the lower ration-shop  price P-ZERO (elastic
demand)  and from lower sales to the rich at the higher price P-M (inelastic  demand). Thus, revenue
rises in both markets.  Since total revenue rises and marketed  surplus is given, P-BAR must increase.
The same result obtains  if one of the two demand curves has an elasticity  equal to one.  However,
note that Radhakrishna,  Murthy and Shah found an elasticity for the poor smaller than one (0.8).  In
that case, revenue from sel!,ng to the poor falls as the price falls.  Thus, the impact  on P-BAR is
ambiguous  for discrete applications  of the policy when the parameter values which have been reported
for India are used.
What is the explanation  for the fact that the impact  on the average price P-BAR is
unambiguously  positive in Case 2 when the policy is applied infinitesimally  but not for a discrete
application  of the policy? Let us start by assuming  that the marketed  surplus is given and does not
vary with price (this assumption  is relaxed below).  Then, any increase in the consumption  of the
urban poor with access to the ration shops is matched  by an equal decrease in consumption  by the- 1IS-
rich.  Since the price elasticity  of the rich is smaller than for the poor, marginal  revenue is larger for
the poor than for the rich.  Then, revenues are maximized  by shifting  consumption  from the rich to
the poor until marginal revenues  are equalized  in both markets.
Thus, a small application  of the procurement  policy will increase  total revenue and also the
sverage price.  However, a discrete application  of the policy has an amb;-uous effect because it might
lead to a shift in consumption  which Is larger than the shift which maxir.izes revenues (so that the
marginal revenue for the rich becomes  larger than for the poor).  This might result in lower revenues
and a lower average price.
The fact that the marketed  surplus increases with the average price cannot reverse these
results.  Assume  the average price increases  for a given marketed  surplus. The higher average price
leads to an increase in marketed  surplus. This lowers the average price.  However, the new
equilibrium  average price cannot be lower than in the absence  of the policy since a lower average
price would result in a lower - not larger - marketed  surplus. Thus, a positive  slope of the marketed
surplus wfll dampen the effect of the procurement  policy on the average price b"t will not reverse it.
Case 3.  Closed Economy. Rationing  and Market Segmentation
In this case, the poor's demand  D P  exceeds  the supply provided  by the ration shops.
Hence,  DU  depends on P.,  the price of the marginal  units, rather than on P., and depends not on
YP but on yp = YP +  V which includes  the value V of having access to the rationed units at the
lower price.  The value V depends on how the rationed units are distributed. If no more ration cards
are distributed to the target population  of urban poor than the supply available  at the ration shops,
then there will be no queuing  and V =  (Pm - PO)Qo,  where Q0 is the procured and rationed output.
If more ration cards are distributed  than the supply available  at the ration shops (i. e., the rationed
demand exceeds the available  supply), it will result in queues, and the value of the time waiting in
line must be subtracted. The length of the line depends  on the number of ration cards relative to the- 16 -
avallable supply. However, the full cost of obtaining  a unit of the product at the ration shop -
including  the value of waiting  time - cannot be larger than the open market cost Pm. The reason for
that is arbitrage, as the poor always have the choice to buy at the open market at the price Pm.  That
determines  the maximum  length of the queue where the full cost of buying the product is the same in
both markets  and  V  = 0 (and yp = YP). We start by assuming  no queuing,  then examine  the case of
queuing.
In the absence  of queuing, equation (3) becomes:
(4)  M * S(P) - DF  [PT(P)] -DU (Pm,  Yp + DR (Pm y
where  p  *  P0+(1-q) P,
q  =  proportion  of marketed  surplus which is procured
OM  (QO  < Du)  and
yp  YP + (Pm -Po) qM =  YP +  (Pm  - Po) QO  is the total income  of the urban
poor (inclusive  of the value V of the right of access  to the rationed output QO
at the low price PO).
The signs of both  dP  and  (Wi  are ambiguous.  If  dM
dPo  dPo  dP
then d  m < 0  but the sign of  dP  remains  ambiguous. In this case, the urban rich lose while
dPo  dP0-17  -
the urban poor may gain or lose (depending,  for the case where  p  rises, on the share they
purchase  on the open market at the higher price Pm).2/
In the case of queuing,  the longer the queue, the lower the income gain V to the urban poor.
At the limit, V equals zero (Yp  =  YP ).  Then, as shown in Appendix  B, equations  B.5 and B.6,
dP./dPOg  0  gs long as  dM/dP  0  orS  5  U/(j-q),  and  dP/dP0 >0  aslongas
dMldP > (dDu/dP,)/(l  -q).  Thus, with a positive elasticity  of marketable  surplus, procurement
will necessarily  lea'  >  a vise  in Pm and to a fall in p.  This is the worst scenario as all three groups
(urban rich, urban poor and farmers as a whole) lose.  Even if the elasticity  of marketable surplus is
negative,  procurement  can still lead to a fall in the average price received by farmers. And
if  dM/dP -0,  then Pm remains  unchanged  and dP/dPO  = q, i.e., P  falls by a proportion  q of the
fall in PO.
We now state
Plo2osition 3.  In the case of a closed economy,  rationing and market segmentation,  if
rationing is done without queuing,  the impact  on Pm and  p  is ambiguous  in general.  If
rationing is done by queuing,  Pm will rise and  p  will fall if the price elasticity
of marketable  surplus is positive (a sufficient  but not necessary condition)  and the queue is
long (so that the full cost of buying at the ration shop approximates  the open market price) .
Then, the farm sector and all urban consumers  lose.  Small farmers and landless  laborers
gain in the short run, while the long-run impact  is ambiguous.
9.  If the average price  P  remains unchanged  or faiis, then since the urban rich pay Pm >  P,
the urban poor pay on average less than  P  and therefore must gain.  However, if  P  rises, the
urban poor may gain or lose.- 18-
Case 4.  Closed  Economy.  Rationing  and  No Market  SegMentation
In this case,  we only  have  to consider  total urban  demand  Du.  Assume  rationing  is done  in
the absence  of queuing. Then, equations  (B.3)  and  (B.4)  become  respectively:
dS  dMq  1  -(Pm-Po)dDU  ddyUq
(5)  dP  dy  dy  Al
dP0 dDU  dDUqM(..q[podDUq..]M
dm  dy  d-P
and
- q,dDU  dDUM)
(6)  dP  dfm  dy  C 1
dP0 B 1 IB 
where  y  =  urban  income,  including  the value  to the  urban  consumers  of having  access  to
qM  units at price  PO.
If  dM 2 o,  then  m < 0  and  dP  > o  as we show  below. Let us firstlookat C 1.
d7  dP 0 dP 0
Since  M = Du, the term in parenthesis  is simply  the compensated  price  effect,  and  thus C 1 < 0.
Second,  the sum of the first  two terms  of B 1 is negative  since
dDU + dDU qM <  U +  U M < o.  Thus, if  dM =  0,  then  A 1 > 0, B 1 < 0,
dPm  dy  dPm  dy  dP
dpm < 0  and  since  C, < 0,  dP > O.
djP 0 O  dP0
This  result  also  holds  for  dM > 0  . Let us first exaniine  the term
dP
F1(Pm  - Po)-dDU  q-1.  This can be rewrirten  as- 19 -
F7P  - (Pm -Po)  dDU  Qo _1  d U  DO  Q1  * ( ID  ° EQ -1,
where  BU  i8 the income  elasticity  of demand  for the urban  consumers. U
For F to be negative  or zero, it must  be the case  that
_Y  y  Y+(Pm -P 0)Q0 +  y
(Pm - P0)Q0 (Pm - Po)Qo  (Pm - P0)Q0
Now Y Is  total  urban  income,  and  is several  times  larger  than  (Pm  - P0)Q 0, the value  of the property
right  to the Qo  rationed  units. Thus,  EuY could  be several  times  larger  than 1 and we woulld  still
have  F S 0.
For India,  NCAER  and  Pandey  report  income  elasticities,  respectively,  of .189  and .71 for
foodgrains,  and  of .616  and .79 for all cereals. Pandey  reports  an income  elasticity  for rice  of 1.06.
The  GOL  (Grain,  Oilseeds  and  Livestock)  study  of the USDA  reports  income  elasticities  of 0.70 for
rice and 0.70 for wheat. These  results  imply  that  F <  0.
Since  the sum  of the first two  terms  of B 1 is negative,  if F 5  0 and  d  0,  then  B 1 is
dP
negative. Since  C 1 < 0,  dP  > 0  Also,  A 1 - dM q_  ) + dDU qM >  a,  and thus
dPm  dP
Thus, if the policy  does  not differentiate  between  urban  rich and  poor, and  if  dM 2 0,
dP
then  the procurement  policy,  which  implies  a reduction in Po, will lead  to an increase  in the open
market  price  PM3  but wuill  lead  to a decrease  in the average  price  p  received  by farmers. Under
these  circumstances,  farmers  lose  on average  and consumers  gain  on average. If the income  elasticity
of demand  for the procured  products  is zero  and if the  urban  rich have  the same  access  to the ration- 20 -
shops as the urban poor, then both urban rich and poor will buy the same proportion at price P0 and
at price Pm, i.e., on average they will both pay p  . HeL2e,  they will both gain.  If, as has been
found, the income elasticity for these products in urban areas of developing  countries is positive, the
rich will buy a larger share at Pm than the poor.  Hence, the poor will gain and the rich may or may
not gain.
The fall in  p  holds even more strongly if rationing is done by queuing, and can hold even
for a negative elasticity  of marketed  surplus (see equation B.6 in Appendix  B).  Thus, farmers as a
whole also lose in this case. At the liriit, V = 0.  Then, all consumers  pay Pm once the cost of
waiting is taken into account, so that both the urban poor and the urban rich lose.  Hence, every
group loses from the procurement  policy in this case.
We now state
Pro2gsition 4.  In the case of a closed economy,  rationing and no market segmentation,  Pm
rises and  p  falls if the price elasticity  of the marketable  surplus is non-negative. This is
true whether ratio..`ng  occurs with or without  queuing. In the absence  of queuing,  the urban
poor gain and the urban rich may gain or lose.  With long queues, all urban consumers  lose.
Farmers lose as a whole.  However, the net buyers (small farmers, landless  labor) gain in the
short run while the long-run effect is ambiguous.
India's public distribution  system has been described  as c ie where ration cards are distributed
to urban poor as well as rich, and where buyers at ration shops have to queue. The value of the time
spent queuing  must be subtracted  from the income gain obtained  because  of the access tc food at price
PO  rather than Pm.  Our analysis  indicates  that this should lead to a fall in the average price paid to- 21 -
famer  as long as the price elasticity  of the marketable  surplus is non-negative  (see Southwestern
corner of Table 1).
The same result is obtained  by Binswanger  and Quizon. They use a general equilibrium
model of the Indian economy  to simulate alternative  price policies. In the case of forced procurement
and equal access by all urban groups to the ration shops, they find that the impact  on  p  is
negative. Sah and Srinivasan  find that the market price increases  with a small amount of procurement
In a model wlth rationing and no market segmentation. The impact on the average price is not
reported.- 22 -
III.  Sumary  and Conclusions
We examined  the effect of the procurement  policy on the open market price Pm and on the
average price  p  received  by farmers under various circumstances,  and
analyzed  the impact  on the
urban rich, the urban poor and the farmers.  The effects  on prices are summarized  in Table 1.
India's trade liberalization  process has mainly affected  industry so far, but the case for free
tradi in agricultural  products is being debated by the government. In the case of free trade, Pm is
unaffected  by the policy and  p  falls, irrespective  of whether  or not the procured output is rationed
and targeted to the poor.  Farmers as a whole lose, the urban poor gain and the urban rich gain if
they have access to the procured output. These results are weakened  if the range between  the CIF
and the FOB price is large.
In the closed-economy  case, if the urban poor can satisfy their demand  at P0 (no rationing),
the effect of the policy on Pm and  p  is generally arnbiguous. However, starting from Pm =  Po
procurement  policy), and if marketed  surplus M increases  with  p,  then a 'small'  application  of
(no
that policy will lead to an increase in Pm and  p  as long as the demand  of the urban rich is less
price elastic than the demand of the urban poor.  Farmers as a whole and the urban poor gain, while
the urban rich lose.  In the short run, the rural poor (small fanners who aie net buyers and landless
labor) lose if they pay P-BAR on average but might gain if they buy mostly -t the ration shops and
queues are short.  In the long-run, the effect depends also on the impact  of the bigher average price
on rural employment  and wages.
In the closed-economy  case, if the urban poor cannot satisfy their entire demand at P0, and
the rationing is by ration cards in the absence  of queuing,  the effect of the policy on Pm and  p  is
ambiguous,  unless the policy does not differentiate  between  the urban poor and rich (or unless the- 23 -
rich do not consume  that product)  and  M k 0.  Then, the policy will lead to an increase in Pm
dP
and to a decreas  in  F  Parmers as a whole lose, the rural poor gain in the short run, the urban
poor gain and the urban rich may gain or lose.  If rationing is by queuing  and the queue is long, then
the policy will result in an increase in Pm if dM/dP > 0  and to a fall in  p  even If  dM/dP < 0.
All groups lose In this case.
As long as the policy is not applied infinitesimally,  there is no indication  that it will lead to
the Increase  in  P  predicted  by Dantwala and Hayami, Subbarao  and Ctsuka.  The effect on  p  is
ambiguors o; negai've, except in the case of (a) a closed economy  with (b) no rationing to the
urban p  -r,  (c) perfect market segmentation  between  urban rich and poor, (d) marketable  surplus
does not fall with pri-.e, (e) the price elasticity  of demand  for the urban pcor is larger than for the
rich, and (f) the procurement  policy is applied  infinitesimally. Only under those conditions  is the
effect on  P  unambiguously  positive, though it is very small.
It is interesting  to note that Hayami, Subbarao  and Otsuka  assume conditions  (b) and (c) to
hold in their analysis  while at the san,a time stating that India's distribution  system results in long
queues and is unable to differentiate  between  urban rich and poor (page 655).  If their description  of
the operation of the policy is correct, then our analysis  indicates  that procurement  will
lead to a decrease in  p  (Southwest  corner of Table 1).  Thus, a pol:cy which was designed  to help
the urban poor may very well have hurt the farm sector as a whole, though it may have helped the
rural poor in the short run.
We have implicitly  assumed that transaction  costs are the same in the private and public
distribution  systems  by setting producer prices equal to consumer  prices.  However, it seems plausible
to assume higher costs for the public distribution  system. In a recent World Bank study on India's
agricultural policies, Sharma  found in the case of wheat that the cost of public distribution  was twice- 24 -
as high as the cost of private distribution. If so, then the probability  that the average price paid to
farmers rises with the procurement  policy is even lower. Moreover, the consumer  benefits associated
with the procurement  policy also fall in this case. The opposite is true if explicit  budgetary funds are
provided  to finance the policy.
This paper has shown that under reasonable  assumptions  the impact  of the policy has been a
fall in the average producer price.  Thus, a policy which was designed  to help the urban poor most
probably  hurt the farm sector as a whole, though it probably  helped the rural poor in the short run.Table  1.  Impact of Pwcurement Policy (i.e.,  setting the procurement price P* below the opeg-market price P,  on P,  oad on tw average price  P
NO TRADEB  FREE TRADE
dM/dP >  0  dM(dP - 0  dM/dP <  0
No Rationing  Segmented  _  . . _  . P  pnd  y  P.ochonged
Maricet~ ~  P  anud  p  may  riw or fFlU,  P. U,rcm  p  any rec or  . MarketPP
betwn  unliss P., =  P4 in which case  fal,  unles  P.  PO  in which  n  neol,
NXo  Oucuiny  No Oucuint  No Oucuinr
segmefAmP.,and  p  - rise or faU  P.l"ts  P.and  p  nity rie  or fal  P.uchne
bctwhen  Rich  p  nay  rw  or fas  p  fans
and Poor
P,, rise,  -p  faun  P., unchanged, p  fallr  P. mia  t  ime  or fall,  p  faIb
dP~~~~~~~
Ritioning
Unwegnment  No Oueuinr  No Oueuinyl  No Oucuing
Market  P  p  m  P. incaes  P. and  p  y  rise or fall  P. unanged
p  felltwP  R  fmay  Ousuiof:  P  fans
Oucuins:  :j~g:  Oucuins:
P, rises,  p  fals.  P,unchafged,  P  falls  P. may ree  or fall  p  falIV _atio  nin  g  ,  _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _  -__  _  _ _ _  _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _  _ _ _  _ _ _  _ _ _  _ _ _ __  -__  _  _ _ _ _  _  _ _  __P- 26 -
Iable  I - con
/  nThe  results of the case of "No Trade' also hold if trade is controlled  by the govermnent  and
is independent  of price.
bl  The case of "Segmented  Market between  Rich and Poor" means that the rich will have no
access to the rationed units at price PO,  but the poor do have access  to the units sold in the
open market at price P,.  There can be no case ef 'No Rationing" and "Unsegmented
Market" because in that case all consumers  buy at PO  resulting in excess demand which must
be rationed (unless dM/dP is so negative  that farmers exacly release the increase in urban
demand, but that raises problems  of multiple  equilibria  and stability).
cl  'bThis  holds only for a 'small' reduction in PO,  and if  IEPI > IERI  where E3  =  price
elasticity  of demand of group j a =  P (poor), R (rich)).  Available  evidence  on India
indicates  that  IEPI> IE't.
d/  This holds if  E  S1+  Y"  where  Ey - income elasticity of demand  of urban
consumers, Y = urban income, and (P. - PO)QO  = the value of the property rights to the
rationed units Qo.  Evidence  indicates  that this condition is easily satisfied.
I/  p  alls as long as  dM/dP > (dDu/dP,)/(1 -q).- 27 -
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Appendix A.
From equation (3):
dM  dDu  dDu
- +  _
dPo  dPo  dPo
or
(A.1)  dMdP  dDuP dDu dPR
cdp  dPo  d 00  dP,dP
Using the definition  of  p,  we  have:
dPA.2)  0  dPo  dPo
and from (A. 1) and (A.2), we obtain:
dM  d  1  dDp  dDu  'dP
- +  |O-q)  d  +  q(Po  I  _P.  - _  - a
dP  dPo  dPo  ~dP 0 OdPOP
or
[o"  dq  lpdM
(A.3)  dP  dPo  [  dPo  J
(l-q)dM_  du
ddP,
10.  In the case of no rationing,  q cannot  be determined  by the government  independently  of the level
of PO  since the entire demand  of the urban poor  D P  must be satisfied  at the price PO.- 30 -
The sign of  d  cannot be exainined  until we have solved for  dP  because
dP 0 dP0
dq _  D  depends on it.
dPo  P
From (A.2) and (A.3), we obtain:
dP .q+(  -q)  dPo  dP o _  )
_,q)dM  Mu~
or
(I-D!al--q+dq  1p_p.  dDu"
(A.4)  d_.  - dP  dP 1
dP  dP 0 '
iPo  {i  q)dM  dDu
d7pdPa
Since  q-Du/M,  we have:
dDu  PdM  Mu  - M  dM dP
(A.5)  dq  _  9.  - dp____  dP___
dP-  M2 M2
From (A.4) and (A.5), we obtain:
d-Du  [(P.  -P)  dDv  1dDu
(A.6)  dP  (  dPo  SM  dP  dP  A  .
_)dM  dD  Du'dM  D
- M 2 -(P°  - P.)  O
r><~  ~ ~  ~  ~~~~d  dP-~~~~~~.
°q5  0
C~~~~~  0
o§31q;ls-t  c@~  U@l  oUW  %g22  w u°i!
o  o-  asI8  <IUci' 
0 . 901,1  ; 
3  ~~  r  1  +1%%1
O~~~~~~~~~~~cj  _  l-  .
3~*~I  ~- 32 -
From (B.1) and (B.2), we obtain:
dM  U.)dm I _(P.  - dDu dPm  dDp  dP.
+  (  J  [PO)  dD  - .-  q(--  1)M,
d7P  [(  )dPo][(  ° dy,  ]  OdP  dPo  dy,  dPo
or
dM  q  I -_  (p.-P  ,  dDu  + dDu qM
(B3)  dP_  dP  dy,  dy,  AOq  AoO.
dodDu  dDup  dD  u  dM  0o
pu+  -d  - qM  +  (Il-q) (P.  -P°)  dy q}-1
WdP  P  dP
From (B.2) and (B.3), we obtain:
dDu  dDuM)
dP  dP, 1 dY  CO
~~~4)  ~PoBo  Bo
In the case of rationing  by queuing, V  =  0 and yp =  yP.  Then,  equations (B.3) and
(B.4) become:
(B.5)  (dM/dP)q  < 0 if  dM  > 0 or if  dM  < dDU/(I-q)
dLP 0 dDu (I q)  dM  ddlP'O
and
dD'
(B.6)dP  _dP  >  if dM > d/(1_q).  If  dM =o,then  dP  -q
dPo  dD  (1 q) dM  dP  O  dP,,  0  dP
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